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employer to the sympathetic public; its purpose is analogous to the union
label affixed to union produced goods. Therefore, it is well to note, that
similar to the ruling in the Di Leo case, the union label can not be withheld from an employer to accomplish an unlawful labor objective, even
though it be conceded that the union has a property right in the label. 3
Moreover, the withdrawal of the shop card is an indication of the union's
disapproval of an employer, similar to the disapproval achieved by picketing. Peaceful picketing, analogous to the union label and shop14card situation, has also been conditioned upon a lawful labor objective.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the present case seems
to have handled the conduct of the Barbers' Union more satisfactorily
than any previous decision. The case seems to indicate a future disposal
of such cases on truly equitable grounds. Although acknowledging the
union's contract and property rights in the card, the court still insisted on
restricting this union's withdrawal of its shop cards to instances in which
the objective to be accomplished by such withdrawal would be lawful.
The reasoning of the court is fully applicable to the analogous rules governing union labels and picketing. The courts have come to a realization
of the great strength and influence of labor unions, and have insisted
as in the present case that labor shall not bring about the ruination of
employers who refuse to submit to arbitrary rules having little bearing
on the functions of organized labor.
PROPERTY-SIGNATURE CARD SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES
NECESSARY TO CREATE JOINT TENANCY
IN BANK ACCOUNT
Plaintiff brought an action against the executors of her husband's will
to recover money deposited in a bank on the ground that it was a joint
account and that she had survivorship rights. The evidence showed that
the now deceased husband opened the account in his name alone. No
changes were made in the form of the account until shortly before his
death, at which time he directed the assistant cashier to write the name
of the plaintiff after his name. At the deceased's direction, the cashier
wrote above both names: "Payable to either of them or survivor with
full survivorship rights." No signature card or other agreement was
signed at that time or subsequently by either the deceased or the plaintiff. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled
to the deposit by right of survivorship due to her failure to comply with
the Illinois Joint Rights and Obligations Statute,' which requires both

isConnors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 At. 600 (1913). Contra: Saulsberry
v. Coopers' International Union, 147 Ky. 170, 143 S.W. 1018 (1912).
14 Teamsters' Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
306 (1926); Outdoor Sports Corp. v. A.F. of L., 6 N.J.L. 217, 78 A. 2d 69 (1951);
Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N.J.L. 729, 65 At. 165 (1906).
'Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 76, S 2.
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parties to sign the agreement permitting payment to the survivor.
Doubler v. Doubler, 412 Ill. 597, 107 N.E. 2d 789 (1952).
Although the Illinois Courts have been called upon to construe the
Statute in former opinions, 2 the precise question as to whether a written
agreement between the parties of a joint bank account, authorizing payment to the survivor, is necessary to create the right of survivorship,
has never before been decided.
The lower court in the present case allowed survivorship rights for
the wife on the ground that a written agreement signed by both parties
is not necessary. The court stated that joint ownership and survivorship
rights became vested in the plaintiff when the deposit was changed into
a joint one. Therefore, the court reasoned that an agreement 3 authorizing
payment to the survivor was not necessary.4
However, the Illinois Supreme Court reversal was based squarely upon
a construction and application of Section 2 of the Illinois Joint Rights
and Obligation Act.5 The court held that the policy of the legislature,
as expressed in Section 2, does not favor the right of survivorship in personal property between joint owners and that the section unequivocally
abolishes such rights except as to executors, trustees, or where an instrument in writing expresses an intention to create survivorship rights. The
writing on the passbook, the court determined, was not an "instrument

in writing" because it did not comply with the requirements as set forth

in the landmark case of In Re Wilson.6
In this case the Illinois Supreme Court held that in order to constitute
2 In Re Estate of Wilson, 404 111.207, 88 N.E. 2d 662 (1949); Illinois Trust and
Saving Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 11. 185, 141 N.E. 546 (1923). Each of these cases
involved a bank deposit in the name of the decedent and another, and, in each of
these cases, an agreement had been signed authorizing payment of the account to the
survivor.
3 In banking practice this is the contract of deposit on the signature cards.

4 Doubler v. Doubler, 343 Ill. App. 643, 100 N.E. 2d 761 (1950). This same construction was given to the 1917 Act.
5 I1. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 76, 5 2. "Except as to executors and trustees, and except
also where by will or other instrument in writing expressing an intention to create a
joint tenancy in personal property with the right of survivorship, the right or incident
of survivorship as between joint tenants or owners of personal property is hereby
abolished, and all such joint tenancies or ownerships shall, to all intents and purposes,
be deemed tenancies in common; provided, that. . . When a deposit in any bank
or trust company transacting business in this State has been made or shall hereafter
be made in the names of two or more persons payable to them when the account is
opened or thereafter, such deposit or any part thereof or any interest or dividend
thereon may be paid to any one of said persons whether the other or others be
living or not, and when an agreement permitting such payment is signed by all said
persons at the time the account is opened or thereafter the receipt or acquitance of
the person so paid shall be valid and sufficient discharge from all parties to the bank
for any payments so made. .. ."
6 404 111 207, 88 N.E. 2d 662 (1949).
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an "instrument in writing" within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act:
1. the instrument must be in writing expressing an intention to create
joint tenancy in personal property with the right of survivorship and
2. the writing should have the general requirements of a will or grant
and must contain a description of the "property, parties, and certainty
of objects" intended to pass to the survivor.
Therefore, the court, in the instant case, concluded that since the
plaintiff did not have an "instrument in writing," she had the burden
of showing that she came within the last proviso of the statute referring
to bank accounts. The court concluded that because of the failure to
comply with the statutory requirement that the agreement permitting
payment to survivor be signed by the parties, the plaintiff was not entitled to the deposit by right of survivorship.
At one time, when one of the parties to a joint bank account died, the
question whether the survivor took the entire estate to the exclusion of
his cotenant's heir or devisee was decided on the theory of the real
property doctrine of joint tenancy.7 Under this doctrine, the title of the
joint tenants, required the four unities: unity of interest, title, time, and
possession. However, modernly, in the great majority of jurisdictions,
the law of joint tenancy applicable to real property and its rules relating
to the unities are not the criteria in deciding if the survivor recovers;'
the usual theories being either gift, trust, or contract.9
In those cases in which the gift theory is applied, the requirements
generally necessary to sustain a gift must be fulfilled-namely, intention,
delivery, and acceptance. Thus, if a donor decedent had made a deposit
in his name and the name of a donee-survivor and if the elements of a
gift were present, the survivor takes an interest.' 0
Other courts use the trust doctrine, in which either the bank or the
depositing party is made trustee for the benefit of the other party named
in the account. However, there must be some evidence of an intent to
create a trust, and a mere provision for payment to either party of a joint
deposit is not sufficient."
732 111.L. Rev. 57 (1937).
s Ibid., at 62. Jepson v. Killian, 151 Mass. 593, 24 N.E. 856 (1890). The Illinois Supreme Court, however, in the case of In Re Wilson, 404 111.207,88 N.E. 2d 662 (1949),

discussed joint interests of personal property in a safety deposit box in terms of
common law unities. See also In Re Estate of Jirouec, 285 111.App. 499, 2 N.E. 2d 354
(1936).
9 Lindner and Boyden Bank v. Wardrop, 291 IUl.App. 454, 10 N.E. 2d 144 (1937);
First National Bank v. Mulich,'83 Colo. 518, 266"Pac. 1110 (1928). See 1 De Paul L.
Rev. 135 (1951).
'0Reder v. Reder, 312 111.209, 143 N.E. 418 (1924); Millard v. Millard, 221 111.86,
77"N.E. 5195 (1906).
11 Bolton v. Bolton, 306 Il. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923); Bell v. Moloney, 175 Cal. 366,
165 Pac. 917 (1917). Some Jurisdictions depend on the use of the deposit form "in

trust for" in order to find a trust. See McDevit v. Sponseller, 160 Md. 497, 154 At.
140 (1931).
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Still other courts follow a contract theory which allows a survivor to
take under 1. a contract between the depositor and the bank for the benefit of the party jointly named;1 2 2. a novation whereby the account originally in the depositor's name was changed to a joint account, the bank
becoming a debtor of the decedent and the survivor who were joint
creditors;' 3 3. a contract between the depositors themselves supported
by consideration. 14 The English courts, not recognizing third party beneficiary contracts, rely on an agency theory. Thus, the English courts
have held that the depositor in opening the account acts as agent for the
beneficiary and, when the beneficiary learns of the account, he may
1
notify the bank. 5
At present, most cases of joint bank accounts are governed by specific
statutes so that the decisions must be examined in the light of these statutes. In Illinois, as in other jurisdictions, the cases have not only employed
different theories, but the applicable statute has been altered from time
to time.' 6 Under the 1821 statute, the Illinois Supreme Court seemed to
be committed to the contract theory,17 but the Appellate Court had indicated the gift theory as an alternative ground.'t Under the present statute, the Illinois courts have for the most part disposed of the cases on a
contract basis. "'
In the instant case, the court decided the question on a contract theory, and further required that a written agreement permitting payment
to the survivor must be signed by both parties, the deceased and the
widow. This holding apparently overrules a prior case which held that
the signature of the depositor alone is sufficient to effect a written agree2 °
ment with the bank.
12 Authorities cited note 9 supra.
13Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926); Chippendale v. North Adams Savings Bank, 222 Mass. 499, Ili N.E. 371 (1916); Deal's Administrator v. Merchants' and Mechanics' Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135
(1917).
14 Attorney General v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 110 N.E. 299 (1915) (contribution by
each party of one-half the account good consideration for right of survivorship to
whole account); Mardis v. Steen, 293 Pa. 13, 141 At. 629 (1928) (seal "imports" consideration).
'5 Willis, Nature of a Joint Account, 14 Can. Bar Rev. 457 (1936) criticized this
theory.
16 32 111.L. Rev. 57 (1937).
17 Ibid.
8

1 Reder v. Reder, 228 Ill. App. 21 (1923); Felter v. Erwin, 206 Ill. App. 518 (1917).
19 Contract within Statute-Illinois Trust and Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill.
185, 141 N.E. 546 (1923); Reder v. Reder, 228 111.App. 21 (1923). Contract not within
statute-Hamilton v. First State Bank of Willow Hill, 254 Ill. App. 55 (1929).
Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 Ill. 208, 153 N.E. 827 (1926) (did not involve a
contract directing bank to pay depositor). In Re Estate of Mcllrath, 276 IlI. App.
408 (1934) (involved a mistake in entering the contract).
20
Erwin v. Felter, 283 Ill. 36, 119 N.E. 926 (1918).
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While there is valid ground to question the strict construction of the
Joint Rights and Obligations Act by the Illinois Supreme Court in the
instant case and the resulting defeat of the decedent's intention, the decision nevertheless indicates once more the basic inadequacy of the statute-namely, it recognizes that a joint tenancy can be created but it furnishes no simple procedure for creating such interest.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-NECESSITY OF WRITTEN
AUTHORITY FOR AGENT TO SIGN
LAND CONTRACTS
Defendant, in writing, appointed an investment broker to act as his
agent for the sale of a ranch. The broker secured a customer and with
the defendant vendor's approval signed a written contract selling the
property to plaintiff. Upon refusal to convey the land, plaintiff brought
an action for specific performance, and as a defense, the vendor replied
that the Wyoming Statute of Frauds' required that "every agreement
or contract for the sale of real estate" be "void unless ... subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith." The Supreme Court of Wyoming,
in affirming a dismissal of the action on demurrer, held that where a contract is within the Statute of Frauds, an appointment of an agent to sign
for one party must be in writing. Wallis v. Bosler, 246 P. 2d 771 (Wyo.,
1952).
One discrepancy in the case immediately is evident. The "Real Estate
Brokers Agency Contract" whereby the vendor appointed his agent
appears to have been "s/ Frank C. Bosler, Owner." Other than reprinting
the document and referring to it in quotation marks as a "written appointment," the court nowhere considered its effect. If it were in fact
signed by the owner, it must be concluded that the document was overlooked in applying the facts to the holding. But as the court ignored the
"appointment" it will not be treated in this note.
The Statute of Frauds2 originally passed by Parliament in 16773 provided in Section 4 that:
... no action shall be brought to charge any executor or administrator upon
any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate, or whereby to
charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default,
or miscarriage of another person, or to charge any person upon any agreement
made upon consideration of marriage, (or upon any contract for sale of lands,
tenements, or hereditaments or any interest in or concerning them,) or upon
1 Vyo. Comp. Stat. (1945) c. 5, § 5-101.
229 Charles 11 (1677) c. 3, § 4.
3 Costigan, Date and Authorship of Statute of Frauds, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 329
(1913); Hening, Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds and Their Authors, 61
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 282 (1913).

